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• This paper presents evidence that democracy fosters trust.
• Second generation immigrants in Europe with ancestries from 115 countries are studied.
• The results are robust to individual, parental, and ancestral country controls.
• The results suggest that less hierarchical political institutions promote trust.
• The mechanism is that institutions shape beliefs that are diffused across generations.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper finds evidence that more democratic political institutions increase trust. Second generation
immigrants with ancestries from 115 countries are studied within 30 European countries. Comparing
individuals born and residing in the same country, those whose father was born in a more democratic
country express higher trust than those whose father was born in a less democratic country. The results
are robust to individual, parental, and ancestral country controls.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
This paper estimates how political institutions shape trust, a
culturally transmitted belief. I estimate how beliefs imparted by
more democratic institutions are transmitted across generations
and shape trust. Second generation immigrants across Europe are
studied. The trust of immigrant groups, within country of birth, is
related to the democratic institutions in their ancestral country.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-NThe 115 ancestral countries offer a wide range of political institu-
tions.
The method combines the approaches of Algan and Cahuc
(2010), who relate trust of immigrants in the US to trust in their
home countries and Tabellini (2010) who studies how political in-
stitutions shape trust at the regional level. This paper studies how
individual trust attitudes are shaped by political institutions.
The analysis adds evidence to Putnam’s (1993) hypothesis of a
positive relationship between political institutions and social capi-
tal. In this vein Guiso et al. (2008) study how ancient city-states af-
fect social capital across Italy. Yet, neither Guiso et al.’s (2008) nor
Tabellini’s (2010) analysis can distinguish if the location or popu-
lation matters for their findings. The evidence presented below in-
dicates that the population is important as the individuals studied
are not exposed to the political institutions directly, as they live in
D license.
M. Ljunge / Economics Letters 122 (2014) 44–49 45different locations. The exposure is only indirect through cultural
transmission in the family.1 Moreover, the analysis below focuses
on how trust is shaped based on the father’s ancestry, which com-
plements the analysis of how themother’s ancestry shapes trust in
Ljunge (2012a) where ancestral trust is the important factor.
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on
how more horizontal interactions between individuals and less
hierarchical institutions promote trust. The literature has found
higher trust when there is less religious hierarchy (Guiso et al.,
2006), less hierarchical language structure (Tabellini, 2008), more
horizontal teaching practice (Algan et al., 2013), more community
involvement (Algesheimer et al., 2012), less surveillance (Jacob and
Tyrell, 2010), and more economic freedom (Knack and Zak, 2003;
Aghion et al., 2010; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006). This paper finds a
positive relationship between trust and more political freedom.
2. Empirical specification
The analysis is based on ordinary least squares regressions of
the following form2:
Trusticat = β0 + β1Democracy_Indexa + β2Xicat + γct + εicat . (1)
Trusticat captures the trust of individual i, born and residing in
country c with a parent born in country a, and a ≠ c , in period
t . This regression is run on a sample of second generation immi-
grants. The degree to which political institutions are democratic in
the ancestral country, Democracy_Indexa, is common to all individ-
ualswith a father born in country a. Xicat captures individual demo-
graphic and economic controls that may affect trust. The country
of birth-by-year fixed effect is denoted by γct , and εicat is the error
term. All standard errors are clustered by the father’s birth country
to allow for arbitrary correlations of the error terms among indi-
viduals with the same ancestral country.
Model (1) addresses reverse causality since the trust of a per-
son born and residing in country c cannot plausibly affect how
democratic political institutions are in the father’s birth country
a. Confounding factors are of course a concern so it is important to
include an extensive list of individual controls inXicat . The inclusion
of the country-by-year fixed effect γct means that the institutional
structure and all other unobserved influences which apply to all
residents in country c in period t are accounted for. It also means
that the variation used to identify the estimate on ancestral trust is
to compare the outcomes of second generation immigrants within
each country of residence and year relative to the democracy index
in their countries of ancestry. Since the country fixed effects are in-
cluded for each year they account for non-linear trends that may
differ across countries. Fernandez (2010) discusses the method in
more detail.3
3. Data
Themain data set is the European Social Survey (ESS),where the
second to fifth rounds are pooled.4 The survey includes information
on the country of birth of the respondent as well as the country of
birth of the father.5 It is possible to identify second generation im-
migrants andwhich countries their fathers originate from. Looking
at 30 countries of birth (and residence) for second generation im-
migrants reduces the concern that the results are driven by con-
ditions in one particular country. Individuals with ancestry from
1 This result aligns with Putterman and Weil (2010) who find that populations
and not locations matter for economic development.
2 The results are robust to using the ordered Logit or the ordered Probit estimator.
3 For an application of the method, see for example Ljunge (2012b).
4 See Table A.1 for the participating countries in each round. The first round does
not include information on parental birth country.
5 Extensive documentation of the data is available at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.115 countries are observed.6 This reduces the concern that the re-
sults are particular to a small number of ancestral backgrounds. The
summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The second generation
immigrants are similar to the native population on observables.
3.1. Individual trust
Generalized trust for the individual is measured with the stan-
dard trust question, ‘‘Using this card, generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?’’ The respondent is asked to re-
spond on a scale, ‘‘Please tell me on a score of 0–10, where 0means
you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be
trusted’’.7
3.2. Political institutions in the father’s country of birth
Political institutions in the father’s country of birth are mea-
sured by the polity2 variable from the Polity IV project.8 The vari-
able takes on values from −10 for strongly autocratic to +10 for
the most democratic political institutions (−9 is the lowest value
observed in the sample). The democracy measure can be matched
with second generation immigrants from 115 nations in the ESS.
3.3. Individual variables
The ESS includes a rich set of individual controls. Age, gender,
marital status, education, employment status, and religious affil-
iation are observed. Marital status is captured by two dummies
for married and never married, with widowed and divorced be-
ing the excluded category. Education is captured by one dummy
for tertiary (university) degree and above, and one dummy for up-
per secondary as the highest attained degree. Lower education is
the excluded category. One dummy captures individuals who are
out of the labor force (students, not employed and not looking for
work, and retired) and another dummy for unemployed who look
for work. Those employed are the omitted category. I create one
dummy for the bottom three income deciles (within country), Low
Income, and one dummy for the middle four deciles, Middle In-
come. Religion dummies for being a Catholic, a Protestant, or an
Orthodox are included while other religious denominations are in
the excluded category.
3.4. Additional ancestral country characteristics
Ancestral country political institutions, the variable of main in-
terest in the analysis below, are related to other ancestral country
characteristics. Ancestral country trust is computed as averages by
country across thewaves in the integrated European/World Values
Survey.9 The log of the ancestral country’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita is used to measure the effect of ancestry from
a more developed nation. The data is from the World Develop-
ment Indicators.10 To account for ancestral institutional influences
I use rule of lawmeasure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) from theWorld Bank.11 The measure of how important pol-
itics is in life is country averages across thewaves in the integrated
European/World Values Survey.
6 Political institutions can be linked to immigrants from 115 countries but other
ancestral country variables are available for fewer countries.
7 Johnson and Mislin (2012) provide experimental validation that trust elicited
by the trust question correlate with trusting behavior.
8 For details on the measure see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.
htm.
9 Extensive documentation is available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
10 I use data compiled by Samanni et al. (2010) as the source for these ancestral
country characteristics.
11 Data and documentation are available at http://www.govindicators.org.
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Summary statistics.
Variable Immigrant
father sample
Native
population
sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Trust 4.84 2.47 4.86 2.52
Polity2, father’s birth country 5.94 5.80
Age 43.8 18.0 47.9 18.7
Female 0.543 0.498 0.541 0.498
Married 0.488 0.500 0.533 0.499
Never married 0.329 0.470 0.271 0.444
Upper secondary degree 0.500 0.500 0.446 0.497
College/university degree 0.268 0.443 0.230 0.421
Employed 0.445 0.497 0.482 0.500
Unemployed 0.049 0.215 0.038 0.191
Low income 0.224 0.417 0.253 0.435
Middle income 0.303 0.459 0.299 0.458
Catholic 0.170 0.376 0.299 0.458
Protestant 0.062 0.242 0.127 0.333
Orthodox 0.119 0.324 0.108 0.311
Upper secondary education, father 0.186 0.389 0.201 0.401
Tertiary education, father 0.123 0.329 0.090 0.286
Working father (at age 14) 0.840 0.367 0.870 0.337
Upper secondary education, mother 0.178 0.383 0.174 0.379
Tertiary education, mother 0.093 0.290 0.068 0.251
Working mother (at age 14) 0.587 0.492 0.539 0.498
Observations 8075 161571
Notes: Data from the European Social Survey, rounds 2 through 5. The immigrant
father sample refers to individuals born in the country of residence whose father
is born in a different country. The native population sample excludes individuals
who are born abroad or have one parent born abroad (compared to the individual’s
residence country).
4. Results
The first results from a model with only the most exogenous
individual controls, as well as the country of birth-by-year fixed
effects, are presented in the first specification of Table 2. There is a
positive and highly significant estimate on the democracymeasure
in the father’s birth country. To account for individual confounders
the second specification adds individual controls formarital status,
education, labor market status, income, and religion. The estimate
on ancestral country democracy remains strongly significant. The
estimates on the individual controls are similar to those in the
literature; see for example Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
The estimated coefficient on ancestral democratic institutions
is comparable in magnitude to other determinants of trust. Mov-
ing from a strongly autocratic to a strongly democratic ancestry
implies an impact on trust corresponding to one and a half times
the influence of a high school degree (compared to less education).
It also corresponds to about two thirds of the difference between
high school and college education. The estimates imply a quantita-
tively significant role for political institutions in forming trust.
To account for parental influences on trust, in particular hu-
man capital and labor supply, the following specification adds con-
trols for upper secondary, tertiary education, and if the parent was
workingwhen the individualwas age 14, for the father andmother,
respectively. This shuts down any intergenerational transmission
of trust through parental education. Controlling for the parents’,
as well as the individual’s own, education is a direct way to ac-
count for the transmission of human capital from the family back-
ground.12 The influence of ancestral democracy remains strongly
positive. Moreover, a working father and a highly educatedmother
have strong positive associationswith trust. These controls also ac-
count for sorting on education and labor supply among immigrant
12 Fernández and Fogli (2009) use proxies for parental education to account for
human capital transmission in their study of female labor force participation as their
data do not include information in the parents’ education level.Table 2
Trust and democracy. Baseline results.
Dependent variable: trust
(1) (2) (3)
Democratic institutions (polity2), 0.020 0.017 0.015
father’s birth country (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Age −0.004 −0.028 −0.023
(0.008) (0.012)** (0.012)*
Age squared/100 0.003 0.027 0.025
(0.008) (0.012)** (0.012)**
Female −0.017 −0.052 −0.055
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052)
Married 0.029 0.031
(0.072) (0.072)
Never married −0.006 −0.016
(0.109) (0.108)
Upper secondary 0.266 0.238
(0.073)*** (0.071)***
College or university 0.934 0.820
(0.081)*** (0.079)***
Outside the labor force 0.016 0.025
(0.060) (0.060)
Unemployed −0.259 −0.235
(0.170) (0.170)
Low income −0.149 −0.133
(0.077)* (0.076)*
Middle income −0.003 0.008
(0.060) (0.060)
Catholic −0.082 −0.076
(0.091) (0.090)
Protestant 0.172 0.150
(0.097)* (0.096)
Orthodox 0.095 0.092
(0.132) (0.138)
Upper secondary education, father −0.045
(0.052)
Tertiary education, father 0.168
(0.121)
Working father (at age 14) 0.225
(0.068)***
Upper secondary education, mother 0.301
(0.076)***
Tertiary education, mother 0.362
(0.126)***
Working mother (at age 14) −0.002
(0.052)
Country-by-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.096 0.118 0.122
Observations 8393 8075 8075
Notes: The dependent variable is trust, which ranges from 0, most distrustful, to 10,
most trustful. The sample is of second generation immigrants with an immigrant
father. Democratic institutions measured by the polity2 variable from the Polity
IV project range from −10, strongly autocratic, to 10, strongly democratic. Data is
from the second to fifth waves of the European Social Survey. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Standard errors allow for clustering on the father’s birth country.
* Significance, p < 0.1.
** Significance, p < 0.05.
*** Significance, p < 0.01.
parents, although the summary statistics in Table 1 do not indicate
sorting as second generation immigrants and their parents look
similar to natives on observables.
Yet, selection of migrants may not be a problem for identify-
ing the influence of political institutions on trust. If there is selec-
tion of migrants, for example if only the most trusting migrate, it
may not affect the estimate since it is identified from differences,
not levels, across ancestral countries. Moreover, if selection is dif-
ferential such that more trusting individuals in autocratic regimes
tend to migrate, relative to migrants from more democratic coun-
tries, this would attenuate the estimate. The challenge to identifi-
cation would be differential selection such that migrants from less
democratic countries come from the bottom of the trust distribu-
tion while migrants from more democratic countries come from
the top of the trust distribution.
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Robustness to additional ancestral factors.
Dependent variable: trust
Alternative specification: Trust Economic development Rule of law Income inequality Political attitudes Exclude strongly
democratic ancestries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratic institutions (polity2), 0.020 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.022
father’s birth country (0.007)*** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.006)*** (0.008)**
Trust, father’s country of birth 0.334 0.617 0.679 0.538 0.252 0.959
(0.422) (0.440) (0.438) (0.415) (0.448) (0.616)
log of GDP per capita, −0.024 0.010 0.010 −0.015 0.017
father’s country of birth (0.036) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) (0.071)
Rule of law, father’s country of birth −0.047 −0.063 −0.041 −0.105
(0.070) (0.066) (0.065) (0.057)*
Gini coefficient (of income) −0.007 −0.010 −0.006
father’s country of birth (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Importance of politics, 0.485 −0.039
father’s country of birth (0.134)*** (0.206)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-by-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.124 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.129 0.101
Observations 7468 7298 7298 7260 7257 3764
Notes: The dependent variable is trust, which ranges from 0, most distrustful, to 10, most trustful. All specifications study second generation immigrants and estimate the
effect of political institutions in the father’s country of birth on trust. Individual controls include age, age squared, gender, education, labor force attachment, income, and
religious denomination. Country of birth-by-year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Data is from the second to fifth waves of the European Social Survey. Trust
and the importance of politics in life are computed by country across the waves in the integrated European and World Values Survey. GDP per capita and the Gini are from
the World Development Indicators, and the rule of law measure from the Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank. Column (6) restricts the sample to those
with ancestries from countries with polity2<10. Standard errors in parenthesis, which allow for clustering on the father’s birth country.
* Significance, p < 0.1.
** Significance, p < 0.05.
*** Significance, p < 0.01.To assess the influence of migrant sorting the trust of first gen-
eration immigrants and the native population in their respective
birth country have been examined. Focus is on European countries
since the ESS provides the same trust measure for both migrants
and natives. The result indicates that the estimate on ancestral
country democracy is not driven bymigrant sorting. First, migrants
are on average more trusting than the native population in their
birth country. Second, the positive trust gap of migrants is on av-
erage higher for those from less democratic countries than the
strongly democratic countries.13 Althoughmorework iswarranted
in this area, the patterns suggest that migrant selection does not
drive the positive relationship between democracy and trust. If
anything, it indicates that migrant selection might attenuate the
relationship.
Table 2 uses all the available data. There may be a concern that
the results are influenced by ancestrieswith few second generation
immigrants in the data. The results are robust to including ances-
tral countries with at least 5, 10, 15, 25, or 50 observations. The re-
sult is not driven by small immigrant groups. This sample trimming
also excludes most low income ancestries such as African coun-
tries.
As Tabellini (2008, 2010) uses regional variation within coun-
tries there may be a concern that the results are influenced by un-
observed differences across regions in the country of birth. Instead
of the country of birth fixed effects I estimate the model with re-
gion fixed effects (and survey round fixed effects). The estimates
are very similar in the two models.
4.1. Alternative ancestral influences
More democratic institutions tend to exist in countries with
high trust and national income. It could hence be that trust is
13 The trust difference between migrants and natives in the less democratic
countries is on average 1.3, while the difference is 0.5 for strongly democratic
countries. Natives are defined as in Table 1.shaped by ancestral trust or level of development rather than
democratic institutions. Algan and Cahuc (2010) find a strong in-
fluence of ancestral country trust on immigrants in the US. To ac-
count for the influence of ancestral trust I include mean trust in
the father’s birth country to themodel.14 Democracy in the father’s
birth country remains significantwhile trust is insignificant as seen
in column 1 of Table 3. The second specification adds the log of
the gross domestic product per capita to the model. Democracy
remains significant while ancestral country national income and
trust are insignificant. It is hence the democratic institutions that
are associated with trust of the second generation immigrants and
not inherited trust or level of development.
Next, another institutional feature of the ancestral country is
added. It is ‘‘Rule of Law’’ where property rights and the judicial
process are large components. Adding the rule of law variable to
the model in the third column of Table 3 produces an insignificant
estimate while democracy is unaffected. Countries with autocratic
regimes tend to have an uneven income distribution. To separate
out the effect of income inequality from political institutions the
Gini coefficient of the ancestral country is added to the model.
The Gini estimate is insignificant while the democracy estimate is
unchanged, as seen in column 4 of Table 3.
In order to account for attitudes towards politics I compute the
average value that individuals put on politics in their life. A higher
value captures that politics is more important in the ancestral
country. The attitudes towards politics are added to the model in
column 5 of Table 3. The estimate on political attitudes is strongly
positively related to trust and the estimate on democratic institu-
tions remains significant. This corroborates the hypothesis that the
cultural transmission of political attitudes shape trust. Among all
the ancestral country characteristics accounted for only the politi-
cal institutions and attitudes are significantly associatedwith trust.
14 Individual controls and country of birth-by-year fixed effects as in column 2 of
Table 2 are also included.
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the democracy index, one might be concerned that these coun-
tries drive the result. The model is estimated on a sample with-
out the strongly democratic countries (that is, with a polity2 value
less than 10). The result in column 6 of Table 3 shows that democ-
racy remains strongly significant also in this sample (p = 0.010).
Notable is that the attitudes towards the importance of politics is
insignificant in this sample, implying that this effect is driven by
ancestry from strongly democratic countries.
To assess the importance of democracy relative other ancestral
country characteristics trust is regressed on country of origin
dummies (instead of democracy) as well as the individual controls
and the country of birth-by-year fixed effects. The coefficients
on the country of origin dummies, which measure average trust
differences to natives across ancestries, are first regressed on the
democracy index in the ancestral country, which explain 6% of the
variation. Second, the country of origin coefficients are regressed
on ancestral democracy as well as ancestral trust, national income,
rule of law, and the income Gini. The model explains 19.5% of the
variation in trust differences across ancestries. Ancestral political
institutions hence account for 30% of the explained variation,
indicating a substantial role for political institutions in explaining
trust differences among individuals.
5. Conclusion
By comparing second generation immigrants within country of
birth I find that those with a father born in a more democratic
country express higher trust than those with a father from a less
democratic country. The approach of studying second generation
immigrants addresses reverse causality, that trustmay shape polit-
ical institutions, and provides a clear causal direction frompolitical
institutions to trust. Addressing reverse causality is necessary for
a causal interpretation of the estimate but sufficiency requires the
additional assumption that omitted factors do not drive the result.
This is always an untestable assumption required for a causal in-
terpretation. It is reassuring that the estimated influence of democ-
racy is robust to plausible alternative ancestral influences, and that
these influences are insignificant. It provides some credibility that
the identifying assumptionmight hold and that the estimate could
be interpreted causally. The results suggest that spreading democ-
racy might have unintended consequences by promoting trust,
which in turn may lead to further economic development.15
Moreover, it may be important to point out that the result is
not generated directly by the political institutions where they ex-
ist. The estimatedmechanism is that the institutions shape individ-
ual beliefs that are transmitted culturally across generationswithin
families (see Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2010). The estimatedmecha-
nism is a feature of the population exposed to the institutions and
not the effect of living in a location where those institutions are
present. This provides evidence of one mechanism through which
institutions may have persistent effects on outcomes. Institutions
may shape beliefs that are transmitted from parents to children
even when the children live under different institutions.
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Appendix. Table
See Table A.1.
15 Recent contributions make stronger claims that trust cause higher economic
development, Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Tabellini (2010), which builds on for
example Zak and Knack (2001).Table A.1
Countries participating in the ESS by survey round.
Country Survey round:
1 2 3 4 5
Austria X X X
Belgium X X X X X
Bulgaria X X X
Croatia X
Cyprus X X X
Czech Republic X X X X
Denmark X X X X X
Estonia X X X X
Finland X X X X X
France X X X X X
Germany X X X X X
Greece X X X X
Hungary X X X X X
Ireland X X X X X
Israel X X X
Italy X X
Luxembourg X X
Netherlands X X X X X
Norway X X X X X
Poland X X X X X
Portugal X X X X X
Russian Federation X X X
Slovakia X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X
Spain X X X X X
Sweden X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
Turkey X X
Ukraine X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X X
Note: Edition 2.0 of ESS round 5 is used, and the cumulative file for earlier rounds.
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